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Commission’s GM Review and Reform Proposal: Undue Delegation, 
Abdication or Design Flaw? 
 
 
On 22 April 2015 the European Commission published a review of the current 
GMO legislation (the GM Review) 1  and tabled a proposal for its amendment (the 
GM Proposal).2 The GM Proposal aims to allow to the member states to ban on 
their territory the use of GMOs authorised under the EU legislation. This is very 
similar to the possibility for opting out from cultivation of authorised GMOs which 
was finally adopted earlier this year.3 While this may look like a new trend, all the 
more interesting in the context of possible Brexit, Grexit and Danish opt-out from 
the provisions on Justice and Home Affairs, the present article will focus only on 
the GM Review, which essentially admits that the existing GMO regime is a failure.4 
Indeed, a dozen years after the relevant legislation has been adopted, only one 
decision for authorisation of a new GM crop was adopted – the Amflora potato – 
and it was annulled by the General Court.5 Decisions for marketing have fared 
slightly better – there are a few dozen authorized GMOs – but still the decisions 
take many years, raise persistent controversies and are adopted without the 
support by the relevant committee of national experts. It is remarkable that while 
the Commission has been constantly in favour of the authorisation of new GMO 
varieties, its assessments persistently fail to convince the Member States so the 
expert committees (and the Council) have never reached any decision in any 
direction. As the stalemate leaves the Commission in position to proceed with the 
authorisations, and it routinely does so, sometimes in defiance of a clear majority 
of member states against it. This is a responsibility which its current President 
rightly believes it should not bear.6 However, instead of finding a way to restore 
the credibility of the regulatory process, now the Commission is proposing to keep 
it ‘intact’, and only allow to the Member States to opt out of it. 
In the following I shall first take the Commission’s understanding of its role in the 
existing regime on its face value and show that this is inherently contradictory and 
                                                        
1 Communication from the Commission Reviewing the decision-making process 
on GMOs, COM (2015) 176 final, from 22.4.2015. 
2 Proposal for Regulation amending Regulation 1829/2003 (Food and Feed), 
COM(2015) 177 final, 2015/0093 (COD) from 22.4.2015. 
3 Directive (EU) 2015/412 amending Directive 2001/18/EC (Deliberate Release) 
from 11 March 2015. It is noteworthy that it took full five years for this simple 
change to be adopted. 
4 The GM Proposal is discussed in Sara Poli’s paper in the present issue. 
5 T-240/10 Hungary v. Commission [2013]. 
6 In his Opening Statement to the European Parliament on 15 July 2014  
J-C Juncker stated that on the matter of GMOs “I would not want the Commission 
to be able to take a decision when a majority of Member States has not 
encouraged it to do so.” 
2 
 
in violation of the EU law as interpreted by the Union courts. In the second section, 
I shall question the soundness of this interpretation of the case law and argue that 
it is wrong, and that in this way the Commission is abdicating from its 
responsibility to make informed choices itself. The concluding section briefly 
discusses a possible way out of the trap. 
 
1) Delegation and Responsibility of the Commission 
The current system for GMO regulation essentially involves three bodies – the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the Scientific/Appeal committee and the 
Commission. In a nutshell, the safety of any GMO is to be assessed by EFSA, its 
opinion is forwarded to a committee of national experts7, and if the latter fails to 
reach any decision, the issue is referred to the Commission.8 While the role of 
EFSA is supposed to be strictly advisory with the committees of national 
representatives and the Commission in turn responsible for any decision, the GM 
review admits that their control is inoperative in practice.  
This regime relies on the functional and institutional distinction between risk 
assessment (RA) and risk management (RM). The former is considered to be an 
objective process which can be entrusted to unaccountable expert bodies. Only 
the latter is believed to be a matter of judgement so it properly belongs to more 
accountable authorities. Under this system, the expert body is expected to make a 
precise and neutral assessment of the risk which can inform the political 
institutions to make their choice. The academic literature has long since 
questioned whether such neat division is possible in practice.9  Regulation of novel 
technologies, and GMO in particular, is by definition an area where the potential 
consequences cannot be known and their measurement, even by the latest 
science, is impossible. It has been observed that risk assessors, and EFSA in 
particular, are intolerant of uncertainty and, following the principle of parsimony, 
                                                        
7 Under the old comitology rules the issue could be raised to the Council, which 
routinely failed to reach any decision too. 
8 The process is governed by Directive 2001/18/EC, hereinafter the Deliberative 
Release Directive and Regulation 1829/2003 of GM Food and Feed, hereinafter 
the Food and Feed Regulation. EFSA is established and governed by Regulation 
(EC) 178/2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, 
hereinafter the General Food Law. The proceedings of the committees of national 
experts are governed by Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 laying down the rules 
and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of 
the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers, hereinafter the Comitology 
Regulation. 
9 Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Relating Risk Assessment and Risk Maangement: Complete 
Separation of the Two Processes is a Misconception’ [1993] EPA Journal 37. For a 
more comprehensive study see Elizabeth Fisher, Risk Regulation and 
Administrative Constitutionalism (Hart 2007) 
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tend to interpret the lack of evidence as evidence for lack of effect.10 Although 
uncertainty is readily acknowledged by the experts, the employment of science is 
paradoxically understood as way to provide certainty, neutrality and objectivity 
of the assessment. As the potential hazards cannot be established with sufficient 
rigour, scientific advisers tend to conclude that there is no evidence that any 
potential harm is caused by the product so it appears to be ‘safe’. The problem 
with this separation of tasks is that the delivery of such an opinion often makes 
the risk manager redundant. Indeed, if a product is ‘safe’, risk management cannot 
be triggered; on the other hand, if it is said to be unsafe, rarely a politician in their 
right mind will authorise it under any circumstances. In both cases, the risk 
manager is in position to rubber-stamp the conclusions of the risk assessor. This 
could still make some sense if risk assessment could be used as a neutral 
instrument for measurement of risk and attainment of clearly specified risk 
thresholds. However, this is rarely possible, and risk assessment inevitably 
involves considerable measure of judgement; accordingly the assessor inevitably 
enjoys certain discretion. EFSA for instance cannot, and as a matter of practice 
does not, estimate that the risk of horizontal transfer of antibiotic resistance 
amounts to certain percentage to be communicated to the Commission; instead it 
normally concludes what is, in their view, likely or unlikely. 11  Thus, EFSA’s 
opinions, even if they are fully independent and unbiased, inevitably involve a 
measure of discretion which is not immediately obvious.  
This condition, however, does not sit well together with the Meroni12 doctrine. 
According to the latter, delegation of discretionary powers to Union bodies, other 
than those established by the Treaties, is unlawful unless the exercise of these 
powers is subject to strict criteria and effective oversight. Granting discretionary 
power, which “replaces the choices of the delegator by the choices of the delegate” 
in unlawful according to the Court. While this doctrine is quite dated, and has been 
under considerable pressure in the context of the authorities created in the 
aftermath of the Financial crisis, the common understanding is that the 
establishment of regulatory agencies with decision-making powers of their own is 
problematic. 13 The existing agencies, such as EFSA, are lawful only to the extent 
                                                        
10 Marjolein B. A. van Asselt and Ellen Vos, ‘Wrestling with uncertain risks: EU 
regulation of GMOs and the uncertainty paradox’ (2010) 11 Journal of Risk 
Research 281–300. 
11 For an excellent primer how different agencies draw opposite conclusions 
from the same data see ‘Weed Killer, Long cleared, Is Doubted’, New York Times 
27 March 2015. Notably, in 1999 the US Environmental Protection Agency 
reversed its own original conclusion from 6 years earlier on the basis of the very 
same mouse study.  
12 Case 9/56 Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche SpA v High Authority [1958] ECR 
152. 




that their role is strictly advisory and the decision-making is retained by a Treaty 
body, which can exercise choice.  
This limit to delegation is confounded by the increasingly common requirements 
for the Union institutions to base their decisions on scientific evidence. The role of 
the scientific advice was clarified by the General Court in Pfizer.14 The Court held 
that the administration cannot deviate from the received advice unless it can base 
its decision on scientific evidence of equal standing. This is generally understood 
to enjoin it from taking a different view of the same evidence. On the other hand, 
under the General Food Law, EFSA is mandated to gather all relevant scientific 
evidence available, including all evidence produced by the relevant national 
authorities, and to make its conclusion on that basis. Thus, whenever it fulfils its 
mandate, it would become impossible for the Commission to deviate from EFSA’s 
opinion,15 for it would not be able to rely on any scientific evidence which is not 
already taken into account by EFSA! It follows that if it is to remain compliant with 
the requirements for scientific justification set in Pfizer, the Commission must 
always defer to EFSA. However, whenever the Commission cannot chose to do 
otherwise, it fails to exercise its own responsibilities, and this amounts to 
impermissible empowerment of EFSA which the Meroni court aimed to prevent. 
In theory, this condition might be remedied by a layer of political control through 
the comitology; indeed Meroni states that delegation of clearly defined executive 
powers is acceptable if it is subject to supervision. In the case of GMO the criteria 
for authorisation are sufficiently clear, however, as the GM Review now officially 
recognises, the supervision is missing. The political control is to be provided by  
the Scientific Committee(s) pursuant to Art. 28 of the Deliberate Release Directive 
and by the Appeal Committee, pursuant to Art. 30 thereof and the Comitology 
Regulation. In theory, they are informed by EFSA’s opinion but the final decision 
is their responsibility; their members are free to vote either way and chose to 
deviate from the recommendation.16 However, it is now officially recognised that 
this layer of control is blocked. The Commission admits what has been obvious for 
many years – that the control which the national experts were meant to exercise 
over the authorisation process does not function so that all of the decisions are 
adopted “without the support of the Member States’ committee opinion.”17 More 
importantly, it also recognises that the Commission considers itself unable to 
exercise any measure of judgement of its own and always defers to the 
recommendations of its advisor. The GM Review insists that the Commission is 
                                                        
14 T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council [2002] II-03305 
15 Although we do not think that this is the correct interpretation of the Pfizer 
case, this is precisely how the Commission understands its role in the 
authorization process, as per admitted in the GM Review. We shall discuss the 
problems with that in Part III. 
16 In principle Committees may be constrained by Pfizer as much as EFSA and the 
Commission, but they are in better position to rely on the “other factors”. I will 
return to the role of the latter below.   
17 See the GM Proposal, recital 4. 
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under legal obligation to do so. In the next section I will question this 
interpretation of the Union law, but it is true that this understanding is consistent 
with the Pfizer doctrine and in any event it is strictly adhered to by the 
Commission itself. Yet, the GM Review stops short of making the obvious 
conclusion from these factual statements – that the risk management stage of the 
authorisation process is inoperative thereby making the risk assessor – EFSA – the 
de facto risk manager. As long as the mechanism for supervision on the 
authorisation is effectively blocked, with the Commission considering itself bound 
to defer to EFSA’s opinion, the latter wields the decision-making power. This is a 
clear violation of the Treaties, at least as they are interpreted in the Meroni. 
In the wake of the Financial Crisis the Meroni doctrine may have been considerably 
weakened 18  and in the recent judgment on the establishment of European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)19  the Court of Justice confirmed the 
legality of its considerable discretionary powers. It even held that the agencies 
could be delegated powers to adopt themselves decisions binding on third parties. 
However, there is one major difference and it is that in the case of ESMA the 
delegation is made explicit in the relevant regulation while EFSA is meant to be 
advisory and to operate under control which fails to materialize. Its authority is 
conferred not by law but by an institutional impasse in the committees and 
Commission’s willful abdication of its responsibilities. Thus, EFSA is turned into a 
regulatory agency by default. Another important difference is that ESMA and the 
new financial supervisors are “structurally intergovernmental”20, i.e. the decisions 
are taken by Boards composed of national representatives. According to Craig, 
“the legal and political reality is that the role played by Comitology committees … 
is played by the national representatives.”21 In contrast, the decisions in EFSA are 
taken by independent expert panels and the member states send representatives 
only in its advisory board. Thus, it is perhaps the most supranational of all 
agencies. Now we know that its judgments on the substance are not supervised by 
anyone.22 
Notwithstanding this, the Commission insists on keeping the existing regime 
‘intact’. Instead of fixing it, the Commission proposes for the member states to be 
allowed to opt out of it. This could solve the problem with legitimacy of a 
                                                        
18 Jacques Pelkmans and Marta Simoncini, ‘Mellowing Meroni : How ESMA can 
help build the single market’ [2014] 1–6. 
19 UK v. Council, C-270/12. See also Paul P. Craig, ‘Comitology, Rulemaking and 
the Lisbon Settlement: Tensions and Strains’, 2014, Oxford Legal Studies 
Research Paper No 75. 
20 Niamh Moloney, quoted by Craig, ibid.  
21 ibid, 47. 
22 Certainly, after the Commission rubber-stamps the authorization, it can be 
subject to judicial review, but the courts are unlikely to assume responsibility to 
make judgements where the Commission abdicates. Thus, EFSA will be allowed 




regulatory decision taken in the face of 19 Member States against it, 23 but will do 
nothing to solve the problem with the violation of the Treaties.   
 
2) Flawed legal analysis  
Thus far we have taken Commission’s claim that it is under legal obligation to 
defer to EFSA at its face value and there is no doubt that this is what the 
Commission does – in this area there is not a single example where the 
Commission failed to follow what is supposed to be an opinion by an advisory 
body. Yet, this position is questionable and the Commission does not offer much 
of a justification. It does not mention Pfizer or the latter case of the Court of Justice 
Gowan 24  which lend support to this interpretation, but makes a few brief 
references to cases which are largely irrelevant for the issue. 
One case mentioned in the GM Review is C-390/99 Canal Satelite Digital SL. But 
the issue in that case was the legitimacy of national measures restricting the free 
movements while GMOs are subject to harmonized Paneuropean rules. It is true 
that the Court of Justice applies, in principle, Art 34 TFEU also to Union measures 
(e.g. Denkavit25 and Alliance for Natural Health26). However, Union measures, by 
definition, do not fragment the single market so the scrutiny of its measures is by 
far less rigorous than the review of national measures. This is made clear in 
Alliance for Natural Health, where the Court of Justice stated that in the area of 
food safety the Union institutions  
must be allowed a broad discretion … which entails political, economic and 
social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake 
complex assessments. Consequently, the legality of a measure adopted in 
that area can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate 
having regard to the objective which the competent institution is seeking 
to pursue …  (para 52, emphasis added). 
 Similar light-touch approach was adopted in earlier cases: British American 
Tobacco,27  UK v Council,28  and National Farmers Union.29  The same light touch 
approach was adopted even in case Kokopelli,30 which the Commission ineptly 
refers to, where the Court stated that it will find a Union act unlawful only if it is 
“manifestly inappropriate, having regard to the objective which the competent 
institution is seeking to pursue”. Although in most of these cases, the act under 
                                                        
23 The case in point is the vote in Council on 11 February 2014 where 19 member 




27 C-491/01, para 123. 
28 C-84/94, para 58. 




review was legislative, in Pfizer the General Court applied the same standard to an 
implementing measure of similar legal nature as the decisions for GMO 
authorization. Pfizer is widely understood to severely constrain the discretion of 
the institutions,31 yet even in that case the General Court made clear that the same 
test of manifest error applies and held that with regard to the high values at stake, 
the decision to deviate from the received scientific advise was justified. Arguably, 
Union institutions retain their discretion on condition that they can justify the 
alternative choice on other compelling reasons. In any event, nowhere is said that 
these are to be drawn from the EFSA’s opinion alone.  
The GM Review refers also to several cases where Commission’s failure to decide 
on applications for GMO authorization for a very long time was found illegal. 
Certainly, its practice, very common in the GMO matter, to keep on returning the 
dossiers to EFSA and fail to decide anything at all is against the law. However 
nothing in these or any other cases suggests that it would be illegal if the 
Commission decided against the authorizations. The Commission seems to have 
forgotten that such an option exists. 
 
3) The Importance of the ‘Other Legitimate Factors’ 
The GM Review makes a welcome recognition of another flaw of the current 
regime. It is that the ‘other’ factors – that is everything that does not pass for 
‘scientific’ in the narrow sense – are routinely not taken into account, despite the 
explicit requirements of the Food and Feed Regulation and the Deliberative 
Release Directive on the contrary.32 These may include socio-economic impacts, 
cost of co-existence, national health and dietary policies, preservation of existing 
farming practices and consumption patterns, environmental policy goals, 
agricultural policy, town and country planning, etc.  The Commission recons that 
“the reasons invoked by member states to justify that they abstained or voted 
against a draft decision of authorisation … are usually not based on science but on 
other considerations.”33  It implies that the reasons ‘not based on science’ are 
inappropriate, or at least not equally important as the scientific ones. This is a bit 
puzzling, as the other factors are not only legitimate but there is a legal obligation 
for them to be taken into account within the centralised authorisation process.34 
                                                        
31 For the standard interpretation see Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies, and 
Giorgio Monti, European Union Law (2nd edn, CUP 2010). However, it can be 
understood just as a requirement for rigorous reasoning, see Vesco Paskalev, 
‘Courts as Academies: Balancing of Scientific Arguments in Regulation of 
Uncertainties’ in A. Santosuosso (ed), Young Scholars Informal Symposium (2012) 
(Pavia University Press 2013). 
32 See the extensive analysis of Mihail Kritikos, ‘Traditional risk analysis and 
releases of GMOs into the European Union: space for non-scientific factors?’ 
(2009) 34 European Law Review 405–432. 
33 GM Review, 3. 
34 Art. 7 (1) Food and Feed Regulation. 
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It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the role of the ‘other factors’ in 
regulation of risk, but the issue is relevant here to the extent that it offers one 
possible way out of the Pfizer-Meroni trap.35  Instead of keeping them out, the 
Commission should take them into account. The legislation needs to be amended 
to make clear that the decisions for GM authorisation are to be taken on an ‘all 
things considered’ basis, rather than on the grounds of the scientific advise 
alone.36 This is not to say that ‘other factors’ should trump ‘science’,37 it is only to 
say that if EFSA and the Commission were taking into account also the socio-
economic factors their opinions and proposals would be more persuasive in the 
first place, and in any event this would provide a sound basis for the Commission 
to justify possible deviations from the received opinions of EFSA. In the GM 
Review the Commission asserts that it is unable to consider such factors. This is 
striking in the context of its ambitions in all other spheres of economic and social 
life – indeed, when proposing any major policy, the Commission claims to have 
assessed comprehensively its potential impact well beyond what is measurable 
and assessable by strictly scientific means. Yet in the area of GMO, instead of 
finding a way to fix the problem, it proposes to enshrine it even deeper by stronger 
separation of risk assessment and risk management, this time at EU and national 
level respectively. This is a step in the wrong direction: the adoption of any new 
technology is a complex matter where many factors are intertwined, so that socio-
economic factors are unavoidable part of the decision and should not be consigned 
to another decision-making level to spare the Commission of the trouble.  
Thus, in view of the present author the regime need to be amended in two related 
directions, both different from the proposed opt-out. First, it is essential to restore 
the responsibility of the Commission, as the default risk manager, by clearly stating 
in the relevant secondary law that it may deviate from the opinion of its advisor. A 
step in that direction has already been made with the Comitology Regulation. In a 
notable departure from the earlier rules, its Art 6 (3) provides that where the 
Appeal committee fails to deliver opinion, the Commission may adopt the act as 
proposed so it is not required to do so. 38  Notwithstanding this change, the 
Commission still feels compelled to adopt the initial proposal, with no legal basis 
as was shown in the previous section. In any event, the substantive legislation can 
be also amended to restore Commission’s control over EFSA as required by the 
Meroni doctrine and also by the general principles of democratic accountability. 
The second direction is to add more emphasis on the need to consider the ‘other 
legitimate factors’ so that the Commission is unable to abdicate from its 
responsibility in that regard either. The adequate inclusion of the other 
considerations should allay any concerns that in deviating from EFSA’s advice the 
                                                        
35 The other way is to abandon the system of rigid separation of risk assessment 
and risk management altogether.  
36 This is what the current regulation requires even now, but the practice 
deviates from that so the relevant provisions need to be strengthened. 
37 For the falsity of this dichotomy see Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative 
Constitutionalism . 




Commission may act arbitrarily. It simply may be required to justify its decision to 
do so by taking into account other circumstances, which, by their nature, cannot be 
adequately considered by EFSA.  
To sum up, the present paper made obvious the link between two problems 
identified in the GM Review – the need for reasoned decisions and the need to 
consider all relevant factors. As the Commission correctly notes, Art. 41 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights requires it to give reasons for its decisions, 
including those for authorisation of GMOs. However, nothing in the Charter or 
elsewhere in the primary law requires these reasons to be limited to those 
prompted by the EFSA opinion. On the contrary – the secondary law explicitly calls 
upon the administration to take other legitimate reasons into account and the 
Treaty requires effective supervision of delegated powers. The obligations to 
justify its decisions and to take other factors into account are, in fact, 
complementary. Respecting them will not only respect the law as it is, but will 
allow the Commission to find the narrow path between the Scylla of Pfizer and the 
Charybdis of Meroni. If the Commission fails to respect both of them – as it 
recognises it does – it is necessary to amend the law to make it do so, rather than 
give to the recalcitrant states a way to walk out . 
